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The Göbbellian Syndrome 
Can we really falsify truth by dictat? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
1. Introduction – Non-standard models of PA 
In a 1996 talk on the Gödelian argument [Lu96], J.R. Lucas commented as follows: 
… in the case of First-order Peano Arithmetic there are Gödelian formulae (many, in 
fact infinitely many, one for each system of coding) which are not assigned truth-
values by the rules of the system, and which could therefore be assigned either TRUE 
or FALSE, each such assignment yielding a logically possible, consistent system. 
These systems are random vaunts, all satisfying the core description of Peano 
Arithmetic. 
2. A Göbbellian dictat? 
Can we really falsify truth by such a Göbbellian dictat? 
In other words, if [(Ax)R(x)] is the PA-unprovable Gödelian formula2  - which is true 
under the standard interpretation - can we add its negation, [~(Ax)R(x)], as an axiom to 
PA, and still obtain a consistent system? 
In his seminal 1931 paper, Gödel argued ([Go31], p27) that, if an arithmetic such as PA 
is ω-consistent, then the system PA+[~(Ax)R(x)], say PA*, is consistent, but not ω-
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consistent. He asserted, without proof, that since [(Ax)R(x)] is unprovable in his 
arithmetic, P, it continues to remain unprovable in P+[~(Ax)R(x)]. This, of course, would 
not be the case if the axiomatic addition of [~(Ax)R(x)] to P were to introduce an 
inconsistency. 
3. Does ZF model PA*? 
Classically, any first order theory with equality is consistent if, and only if, it has a model 
([Me64]; p51(II) & p65, proposition 2.12). Gödel's postulation of the relative consistency 
of PA*, therefore, implies that PA* has a model. 
Further, an implicit belief of classical theory is that first order mathematical theories can 
be interpreted suitably in ZF, and so every model of ZF is a model of such systems. 
The question, thus, arises: Is PA* such a system? 
Now, standard interpretations of classical theory argue ([Me64], p192-193) that the 
axioms of PA can be interpreted in ZF - in the sense that, under suitable interpretations of 
the primitive symbols of PA in ZF, the axioms of PA can be transformed into theorems of 
ZF, and the rules of inference preserved, by restricting the variables to Cantor’s first 
transfinite ordinal, ω, so that the PA-formula [(Ax)R(x)], for instance, would translate as 
[(Ax)((x  ω) => R(x))]. 
Clearly, every model of ZF is, thus, a model of the interpreted axioms of PA. However, 
does this assure us of a ZF model for PA*? 
Now, for PA* to have a model in ZF, we would need [~(Ax)((x  ω) => R(x))] to be a 
theorem of ZF. This, of course, is not possible if ZF is consistent; Gödel has shown that 
[(Ax)((x  ω) => R(x))] is a theorem of ZF, since it is true in every model of ZF. 
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4. Does PA* have a model outside ZF? 
Further, the above argument would hold for every model of PA*, since the induction 
axiom of PA would hold in a non-standard model (cf. [Me64], p115, Ex.2) if, and only if 
- as in ZF - we are able to restrict the range of the variables in it to the natural numbers. 
So, was Gödel's postulation simply a case of a wrongly proven conjecture, or are there 
alternative arguments for concluding that PA* is consistent, and that it has a non-trivial 
non-standard model? 
5. In conclusion 
We note that alternative non-standard models of PA, such as those in Mendelson 
([Me64], p116, Ex.2), or even Cantor's ordinal numbers, 0, 0', 0", ..., ω, ω', ω", ..., ω.0', 
(ω.0")', (ω.0")", ..., essentially consist of a sequence of equivalence classes, {0, ω, ω.0", 
...}, {0', ω', (ω.0")', ...}, {0", ω", (ω.0")", ...}, ...; such sequences are, themselves, simply 
contractions ([Me64], p80) - of non-standard models of PA - that are isomorphic to the 
standard model of PA. 
This follows since each of {ω, ω', ω", ...}, {ω.0",( ω.0")', (ω.0")", ...}, etc. is isomorphic 
to the standard model, {0, 0', 0", ...}, of PA. 
It is difficult to see the significance given to such, non-standard, models in standard 
interpretations of classical theory, since any model of any theory can be used to create 
non-standard models - of the above kind - by simply re-naming the primitive constants of 
the theory, and arranging the renamed domains sequentially.  
Clearly, such extended domains are trivial, since they cannot have any mathematical 
properties - pertaining to the theory of which they are the postulated models - that are not, 
already, in the standard model of the theory. 
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